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The World Resources Institute (WRI) is an environmental 
think tank that goes beyond research to find practical 
ways to protect the earth and improve people’s lives. 
Our mission is to move human society to live in ways 
that protect Earth’s environment and its capacity to 
provide for the needs and aspirations of current and 
future generations.
 
Because people are inspired by ideas, empowered 
by knowledge, and moved to change by greater 
understanding, WRI provides—and helps other 
institutions provide—objective information and 
practical proposals for policy and institutional change 
that will foster environmentally sound, socially equitable 
development.
 
WRI organizes its work around four key goals: 
People & Ecosystems: Reverse rapid degradation 
of ecosystems and assure their capacity to provide 
humans with needed goods and services. 
Governance: Empower people and support 
institutions to foster environmentally sound and 
socially equitable decision-making. 
Climate Protection: Protect the global climate 
system from further harm due to emissions of 
greenhouse gases and help humanity and the 
natural world adapt to unavoidable climate change. 
Markets & Enterprise: Harness markets and 
enterprise to expand economic opportunity and 
protect the environment.
In all its policy research and work with institutions, 
WRI tries to build bridges between ideas and action, 
meshing the insights of scientific research, economic 
and institutional analyses, and practical experience with 
the need for open and participatory decision making.
The EMBARQ global network catalyzes environmentally 
and financially sustainable transport solutions to 
improve quality of life in cities.
Since 2002, the network has grown to include five 
Centers for Sustainable Transport, located in Mexico, 
Brazil, India, Turkey and the Andean Region, that work 
together with local transport authorities to reduce 
pollution, improve public health, and create safe, 
accessible and attractive urban public spaces. The 
network employs more than 100 experts in fields 
ranging from architecture to air quality management; 
geography to journalism; and sociology to civil and 
transport engineering.
EMBARQ is a member of the Bus Rapid Transit: Across 
Latitudes and Cultures (BRT-ALC) Centre of Excellence 
(www.brt.cl), funded by the Volvo Research and 
Educational Foundations.
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foreword
Foreword
WItH MORE Of tHE WORLD’s POPuLAtION 
LIVING IN uRbAN AREAs tHAN EVER bEfORE, 
and the largest agglomerations now home to more than 
10 million people, cities today face urgent and complex 
development challenges. 
In managing growth and providing services, planners 
and politicians increasingly seek to balance economic 
priorities with sustainable development that meets social 
needs and mitigates environmental impacts. This report 
examines efforts by major cities across Latin America and 
Asia to apply such approaches to public transport.
Urban transportation systems significantly affect cities’ 
quality of life and, through associated air pollution 
and greenhouse gases, the wider regional and global 
environments.  These impacts can be mitigated by 
sustainable transport policies which promote cleaner, 
more efficient public transport systems in order to 
reduce congestion, minimize travel times, reduce GHG 
emissions and local air pollutants, decrease road traffic 
injuries and deaths and improve public health.  
Sustainable urban transport can have measurable 
positive impacts and externalities, but in order to 
realize its full potential to transform cities, a transport 
project must be planned, implemented and operated 
effectively. This is far from an easy task, involving a 
myriad political, financial, technical, institutional and 
communication challenges. 
In order to shed light on these challenges, Modernizing 
Public Transportation: Lessons Learned from Major Bus 
Improvements in Latin America and Asia, presents 
a comparative analysis of the performance of 13 
modernized bus systems in cities including Bogotá, 
São Paulo, and Santiago, Jakarta and Beijing. The result 
is an illuminating snapshot of the state of practice of 
bus transport in Latin America and Asia, highlighting 
both common hurdles and problems encountered, 
and positive lessons learned, from recent efforts to 
make getting around mega-cities more efficient and 
environmentally-friendly.
EMBARQ, WRI's Center for Sustainable Transport, 
promotes the use of bus rapid transit (BRT) around 
the world as a sustainable, high-impact and relatively 
low-cost transport solution. The data compiled for this 
report confirms that BRT can provide high-capacity— 
up to 45,000 passengers an hour in each direction— 
with comparatively low capital investment —less than 
US$12.5 million per kilometer. Equally impressively, the 
modernized or new transit systems we looked at were 
implemented relatively quickly—in only two to five 
years from concept  to commissioning—and were able 
to break even or require small operational subsidies.  
The report also summarizes common pitfalls and 
shortcomings encountered in these 13 cities in 
designing, financing and implementing BRT and 
citywide bus systems.  
We hope our findings will enable urban transportation 
agencies in cities already pursuing sustainable solutions 
to learn from others’ experiences, improve their systems, 
and achieve greater transport, environmental and public 
health impacts. We also hope that cities embarking on 
new transportation projects can draw on our analysis 
to avoid the shortcomings of others’ approaches in 
delivering environmentally and financially sustainable 
transport solutions.
As the world searches for low-cost, low-carbon transport 
solutions, this report underlines that BRT projects should 
be championed and prioritized, especially in developing 
countries where infrastructure financing options are 
more limited and rapid motorization is exacerbating 
urban problems of congestion, pollution and road traffic 
injuries and deaths. 
We thank the city officials, experts and professionals who 
shared their data and were candid about their transport 
projects’ challenges and shortcomings, in order that 
others may learn from their experiences. We believe 
their willingness to share processes undergone and 
lessons learned will give rise to improved urban transport 
planning, design, implementation and operation, 
ultimately bringing a better quality of life and cleaner 
environments to the cities of the emerging world. 
Jonathan Lash
President
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tHE MEGA-CItIEs Of LAtIN AMERICA AND AsIA 
rely on public transport to keep their citizens 
moving and economies working while mitigating 
the negative environmental impacts of rapid 
motorization. Increasingly, these cities are upgrading 
or even transforming their public transport systems 
to better serve the needs of their populations and 
the environment. Some of these efforts have been 
more successful than others and some more widely 
publicized. To date, however, there has been no 
synthesis of benefits and shortcomings of the various 
approaches taken, in order to inform future urban 
transport projects in emerging nations. There are several 
studies, for example, about the celebrated successes 
of the TransMilenio bus rapid transit system in Bogotá, 
Colombia, and its counterpart in Curitiba, Brazil, but 
little literature on the shortcomings of these, and similar 
systems, creating an informational gap in constructive 
advice on lessons to be learned. 
This study seeks to fill that information gap by 
summarizing key findings and lessons learned from  
a comprehensive review of major bus improvements 
1 completion within the past 15 years is considered recent.
in 13 Latin American and Asian cities. In particular, 
it reviews and synthesizes information regarding 
challenges experienced by transport system decision 
makers in three key areas: planning, implementation 
and operations. In order to assist urban transport 
planners and implementing agencies, the study also 
provides recommendations on avoiding or mitigating  
similar difficulties when introducing bus reforms  
in developing world cities. 
The selected cities were chosen for several reasons 
including: long-term recognition in urban transport 
practices, multi-functional land usage practices for 
urban environments, and/or the recent1 completion 
of bus system improvements. The review includes the 
following cities: Curitiba, Quito, Bogotá, São Paulo, 
León, México City, Pereira, Guayaquil, Santiago and 
Guadalajara in Latin America, and Jakarta, Beijing and 
Ahmedabad in Asia. The cities vary in size and socio-
economic characteristics (see table 1), but in each case 
buses account for a substantial portion of total public 
transport use and bus rapid transit (BRT) was introduced 
as a component of reform. 
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City Country
Metro	AreA	
PoPulAtion	2006
Metro	AreA	
PoPulAtion	Density	
(PoP/kM2)
2009	HuMAn	
DeveloPMent	inDex	
vAlue	(rAnk)	a
Curitiba
Brazil
2,960,000 4,568
0.813
(75)
são	Paulo 18,610,000 9,456
santiago Chile 5,700,000 2,896
0.878
(44)
Beijing China 10,850,000 14,505
0.772
(92)
Bogotá
Colombia
7,800,000 15,058
0.807
(77)
Pereira 443,000 631
Quito
Ecuador
1,550,000
3,236
0.806
(80)
Guayaquil 2,460,000 7,130
Ahmedabad India 5,340,000 11,459
0.612
(134)
Jakarta Indonesia 13,670,000 10,051
0.734
(111)
léon
México
1,470,000 1,205
0.854
(53)
México	City 19,240,000 9,286
Guadalajara 3,950,000 6,628
Sources: data from city Mayors, statistics, http://www.citymayors.com/sections/rankings_content.html; united nations environment 
programme, Human development index (Hdi) 2009, http://hdrstats.undp.org; department of risaralda, colombia,  http://risaralda.com.co/; 
city of Guayaquil, http://www.guayaquil.gov.ec/; csT india, eMbarQ center for sustainable Transport, “Transport in cities, india indicators”, 
2009, http://www.embarq.org/en/india-transport-indicators; México national institute for Federalism and Municipal development, e-local, 
http://www.e-local.gob.mx
a Hdi rank is out of 182 countries.
Table 1  Key Statistics of Selected Cities
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How to Use this report 
This synthesis report summarizes cross-cutting issues 
gleaned from an in-depth review of 13 cities based 
on an analysis of available material, site visits, and 
interviews with stakeholders, especially members of 
implementation teams and transit operators. Case 
studies about several of the reviewed cities have been 
published on the EMBARQ (www.embarq.org) website. 
The following three sections of this report provide:
• An overview of transit provision in the target cities, 
together with technical, financial and performance 
information about the bus systems;
• A synthesis of lessons learned from addressing 
issues that arose in the planning, implementation 
and operation of the bus systems; 
• Conclusions and recommendations for urban 
planners and transit decision makers in  
developing countries. 
Key findings
The transit improvements in 13 cities reviewed in this 
report resulted in a variety of improved conditions 
for city commuters, some of which also benefited 
the population at large and the environment. These 
included reductions in air pollutants, greenhouse gas 
emissions, noise and traffic accidents, and efficiency 
improvements by bus rapid transit corridors compared 
with traditional bus services. Corridors in the selected 
bus systems exhibit very high usage levels (1,780-43,000 
passengers/hour/direction), with comparatively low 
capital investments2 (US$1.4-12.5 million/km), and little 
or no operational subsidies. 
The review also revealed common challenges and lessons:
• No project was perfectly executed, due to a 
combination of institutional, technical, financial 
and/or politically induced time constraints; 
• Initial implementation was generally rushed, 
causing operational and user problems; 
• Financial and institutional sustainability was not 
necessarily assured;   
• Bus rapid transit routes were often not fully integrated 
into the rest of the cities’ public transport system;
• Many projects faced extensive challenges in 
accommodating regular city traffic; 
• In cities where BRT services were new, or expanded 
quickly, public information and user education was 
critically important to a smooth launch. 
recommendations
PlAnning PHASe
• Institute a comprehensive planning process 
which combines financial, legal, institutional 
and environmental concerns with engineering/ 
technical efforts.
• Improve the quality of information used to make 
decisions on key building blocks of a new or 
improved transport system, such as: route selection, 
basic infrastructure concepts (median lanes, types 
of stations, terminals), vehicle  technologies, and 
types of operation.
• Dedicate enough resources—time and money— 
for adequate project preparation, but avoid endless 
alternatives analysis. 
• Use experiences from other cities as a reference, but 
adapt system components and characteristics to 
local conditions. 
• Seek to create special purpose full-time teams for 
system planning and implementation, independent 
from day-to-day responsibilities. 
deCiSion-mAKing ProCeSS
• Get early approval from high-level decision makers 
as top-down approaches are faster and resolve 
interagency conflict. At the same time, maintain 
community involvement through education and 
participatory processes. 
• Maintain and nurture high-level approval and  
buy-in during the implementation and operation  
of the system.
• Pay careful attention to regulatory/institutional 
issues, adapting the existing regulatory framework 
if required. Where bus improvements are to be 
integrated with an existing metro system, convince 
the rail operator that the BRT is complementary,  
not a competitor. 
2 not including costs of public space and mixed-traffic road improvements that are sometimes carried out at the same time as brT construction.
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• Create a special purpose agency to plan, oversee 
and control system development, and provide 
adequate coordination mechanisms. 
• Be creative in funding project development, using 
new taxes, loans and non-traditional sources such 
as privatizations and special purpose bonds.
• Involve existing bus operators to mitigate conflicts, 
but use bidding processes to reduce user costs 
through increased market competition. 
deSign PHASe
• Only attempt citywide reorganization of transit 
services where institutional capacity for regulation 
is strong and there is broad public support. 
• Define clear development objectives, estimate 
passenger demand and develop a service plan as 
the basis for physical and operational design.
• Implement gradually, adapting the project on the 
basis of initial experience. 
• Make an effort to use existing right-of-way 
to reduce land acquisition and involuntary 
displacement. 
• Use sound engineering design for new 
infrastructure, especially pavement, to avoid rapid 
deterioration.
• Opt for median lanes and level access platforms 
with many bus boarding doors to increase speed 
and reliability.
• Use strong lane dividers to segregate traffic. Focus 
on physical integration, for instance, by matching 
the heights of vehicle floors and station platforms.
• Design vehicles in line with a service provision plan.
• Wherever possible, minimize negative effects on 
mixed-traffic flow as increased congestion can 
create vociferous criticism and jeopardize support.
imPlemenTATion PHASe
• Generate a realistic schedule and manage it to 
avoid rushed implementation. 
• Have contingency plans ready if system 
components are not complete. 
• Dedicate funds to plan and implement user 
education programs.
• Involve the community in implementation 
through adequate information and participation/ 
engagement programs.
oPerATionAl PHASe
• Match service operations to supply and demand, 
using the intrinsic flexibility of buses. 
• Restructure or transform existing bus operations so 
that they complement rather than compete with 
the new bus rapid transit system. 
• Budget for required infrastructure maintenance 
such as pavement, stations and terminals. 
• Allow time to adapt and implement advanced fare 
collection systems. 
• Use advanced transit management systems if 
operations are complex to help ensure reliability. 
• Promote the system’s image, through good 
public information provision, user surveys, and 
maintenance of fixed infrastructure and vehicles. 
STrUCTUrAl iSSUeS
• Define user fares according to the actual per 
passenger cost of providing the transit service 
(known as the “technical fare”), in order to avoid 
financial difficulties and political interference. 
• Avoid continuous renegotiation of bus operating 
contracts as this approach has often tipped in favor 
of operators. 
• Integrate the bus system development with other 
transport initiatives such as rail transit projects.
• Apply transit-oriented urban development 
concepts to enhance positive impacts and reinforce 
project sustainability. For example, consider land-
use reform, permitting higher densities along the 
mass transit corridor. 
• Have a clear vision for the BRT system’s expansion.
Bus Rapid
overview
overview
ALL 13 CItIEs REVIEWED IN tHIs REPORt 
EMbRACED bus RAPID tRANsIt in response to 
dysfunctional and inefficient transport conditions, 
public discontent, and critical environmental and road 
safety conditions (Hidalgo and Graftieaux 2008). With 
the exception of Brazil,  China and India, prior to the 
implementation of the new bus systems, traditional 
bus services were operated by private providers under 
semi-deregulated fares and routes, coupled with weak 
planning, enforcement, and control strategies (Orrico 
Filho et al. 2007). While traditional bus transport in the 
featured cities was notable for its low user fares and 
extended coverage, it also featured major inefficiencies 
and negative impacts on the surrounding environment. 
Weak local government regulation had resulted in 
excessive bus fleets, inadequate vehicle sizes, obsolete 
equipment, long routes with inefficient and irregular 
operation, and minimal vehicle and infrastructure 
maintenance. The cities also suffered from high levels  
of congestion, accidents, emissions (of local air 
pollutants and carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse 
gas), as well as noise pollution. A common feature 
of traditional transit services is competition among 
vehicles for passengers known as “war of the penny”, 
competition on the street, or competition in-the-
market3, which often leads to oversupply of buses 
and low-quality service. 
Compared to the other countries, Brazil had developed 
stronger institutions and regulations to plan and manage 
the bus transit services at the local level under private 
provision by large companies (Orrico Filho et al. 2007). In 
contrast, China and India had mainly kept transit provision 
under local public agencies. Despite the differences in 
regulation and ownership, services in São Paulo, Beijing 
and Ahmedabad were considered of poor quality before 
changes were made: crowded, slow, and unreliable due 
to lack of integration, inadequate infrastructure, and 
interference from general traffic congestion.
3 Term commonly used by transport economists as opposed to competition for-the-market which is generated through bidding processes 
for service or concession contracts. competition in-the-market often leads to high fares, oversupply of buses and low quality service, while 
competition for-the-market can result in lower user fares, benefitting the public (ardila, 2003).
bus rapid transit (brT), as the name 
suggests, is a rubber-tired mode of 
public transport that enables efficient 
travel (wright and Hook 2007). brT 
flexibly combines stations, vehicles, 
services, running ways, and intelligent 
transportation system (iTs) elements 
into an integrated system with a strong 
brand that evokes a unique identity 
(levinson et al. 2003). brT has the 
potential to provide a higher quality 
experience than possible with traditional 
bus operations due to reduced travel 
and waiting times, increased service 
reliability and improved usability (diaz 
et al. 2004). brT is also capable of 
improving local and global environmental 
conditions (pnuMa 2010). 
The successful system in curitiba, 
whose first busway was in operation 
in 1973 and its full brT in 1982, has 
been followed and adapted by 16 
cities throughout latin america and 
the caribbean. Today, brT systems in 
various forms are in operation in more 
than 70 cities around the world, and 
being planned in dozens more. The 
increased interest in brT is the result 
of its ability to deliver high-performance 
transit services at relatively low costs, 
with short implementation times and high 
positive impacts (wright and Hook 2007; 
diaz et al. 2004). applications of brT 
systems range from isolated corridors 
to integrated transport networks, and 
in some cases, are a component of 
citywide transport reforms. 
despite the growing popularity of the 
concept, brT implementation faces 
several obstacles. since few high-
quality applications of brT exist, there 
remains a lack of widespread familiarity 
with the concept. brT typically 
uses existing road infrastructure 
which reduces road capacity for 
vehicular traffic. Finally, planning 
and implementing brT requires the 
coordination of several agencies and 
appropriate funding levels. 
  
eMbarQ, the world resources 
institute center for sustainable 
Transport, works to catalyze 
environmentally and financially 
sustainable transport solutions to 
improve quality of life in cities. To that 
end, eMbarQ has supported the 
planning, implementation and evaluation 
of brT systems in at least 14 cities.
BUS rAPid TrAnSiT defined
TermsBus system improvements reviewed in this study sought to change the status quo of urban transport services in one of two ways: through relatively small-scale corridors4 or through large-scale reorganizations. Each transport system reviewed used components of BRT to different degrees. Although BRT is the core constituent in most 
systems, in São Paulo and Santiago it is part of much 
broader, citywide transit reform. The precise mix and 
scope of the BRT components applied in each project 
depended on the local market, physical restrictions and 
the availability of resources. Table 2 describes the scale, 
supply and demand of the case study bus systems. For 
comparative purposes, figures 1-7 then summarize the 
main indicators of system performance and costs. The 
scale of systems ranges from six million passengers per 
weekday in São Paulo, to relatively low-volume corridors 
such as Ahmedabad’s Janmarg with 35,000 passengers 
per weekday (figure 1 on page 14). 
4 in most cases, small-scale corridors were implemented with the 
goal of gradual expansion.
Bus system 
improvements 
sought to 
change the 
status quo
Terms
overview
ArTiCUlATed BUS
Typically an 18m-long bus, with 
three doors, one pivoting joint  
in the bus body, three axles  
and a capacity of approximately  
170 passengers
Bi-ArTiCUlATed BUS
Typically a 25m-long bus, with five 
doors, two pivoting joints in the bus 
body, four axles and a capacity of 
approximately 250 passengers.
BUS lAne
a traffic lane reserved for buses that 
may be painted, striped or signed, 
but is not physically separated 
from mixed traffic. buses are given 
priority in the lanes either throughout 
the day, or during specific intervals, 
and sometimes taxis, high-
occupancy vehicles and bicycles 
are permitted to share the bus 
lanes. because other traffic is not 
physically prevented from entering 
the lanes, the travel time savings is 
typically small, relative to a busway.
BUSwAy
a priority lane for buses physically 
segregated from mixed traffic by 
curbs, rumblestrips, guiderails 
or other barriers. Many at-grade 
busways are in the median to 
minimize conflicts with turning 
vehicles at intersections, but they 
can also be elevated or below-
grade. an open busway would 
permit all bus operators to use the 
lanes, while an exclusive busway 
would be restricted to a single type 
of service or operator (for instance 
to only brT buses).
ConvenTionAl BUS
Typically a 12m-long bus, with 1–2 
doors and capacity of approximately 
80 passengers. conventional buses 
can have low or high floors. 
eleCTroniC (or AUTomATiC) 
fAre ColleCTion
efficient cashless passenger fare 
payment system, incorporating 
magnetic stripe fare cards or 
smartcards, fare validation devices, 
turnstiles and ticket vending 
machines. Fare collection can be 
on-board or off-board the bus, but 
off-board fare collection reduces 
passenger boarding times and 
therefore vehicle delays. 
feeder BUS
Typically a conventional bus or 
smaller vehicle that connects, or 
“feeds” passengers in lower-density 
neighborhoods to trunk route 
stations, terminals or integration 
points where they can transfer 
to other routes. in a physically 
integrated system, feeders would 
stop at the brT station.
inTegrATion
bus systems can have three levels 
of integration: physical, operational 
and fare integration. physical 
integration refers to infrastructure 
that allows passengers to transfer 
between bus routes and other 
modes of transport; operational 
integration involves co-ordination of 
schedules; fare integration involves 
payment of a single fare or reduced 
fares for combined services.
inTelligenT 
TrAnSPorTATion  
SySTemS (iTS)
a suite of technologies that  
allows for dynamic control and 
operation of a transit system, 
including automatic vehicle 
locators, centralized vehicle control, 
integrated traffic signal control, 
automatic fare collection and real-
time passenger information systems. 
ligHT rAil TrAnSiT (lrT)
a railway with less capacity than 
heavy rail (subway, metro), that may 
use shared or exclusive rights-of-
way, high or low platform boarding 
and either multi-car trains or single 
cars (apTa 1994). 
Trolley BUS
an electric rubber-tired bus drawing 
current from overhead wires to 
which it is tethered. similar to a 
streetcar or trolley, with rubber tires 
instead of track (apTa 1994).
TrUnK Corridor
The main spine of a trunk-feeder 
brT system, which is typically  
a segregated busway along  
a high-density corridor.
Key TermS defined
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City
ProJeCt	(initiAl	yeAr)
GenerAl	DesCriPtion
suPPly/
DeMAnD
CoMMents
Curitiba
rit
(1973)
Citywide integrated bus system with 
five BRT corridors (65 km of median 
busways), 139 stations, 26 terminals, 
340 km of feeder routes, 185 km of 
inter-district circular routes, 250 km 
of "rapid bus" routes; total of 340 bus 
lines and 1,100 km of bus routes.
2,200 vehicles, including 114 
bi-articulated diesels as well as 
articulated, conventional, small 
buses, special service buses; 
electronic fare collection system.
2.26 million passengers/day.
7 private operators under 
agreements with a public authority.
New 22 km BRT corridor under 
construction. 
Quito
Metrobús-Q
(1995)
Three BRT corridors (37 km, mostly 
median busways); 68 stations, 9 
terminals; integrated feeder services; 
centralized control (separately for 
each corridor) 
189 articulated buses (113 trolley 
buses), 185 feeder buses, coin-
based fare collection.
560,000 passengers/day.
Public operator/owner (Trolebús and 
Ecovía corridors), private operator 
(North corridor), no fare integration 
among corridors. Discussion to 
replace Trolebús with an LRT.
Bogotá
transMilenio
(2000)
High-capacity BRT system with 84 
km median busways, 104 stations, 
10 integration points, integrated 
feeder services and advanced 
centralized control. 
1,190 articulated buses,  
10 bi-articulated buses,  
448 feeder buses, electronic  
fare collection system.
1.6 million passengers/day.
Five private groups, partially formed 
by some traditional operators, hold 
concession contracts for 7 trunk and 
6 feeder zones. Two new corridors 
(22 km) under development as well 
as a citywide reform of traditional bus 
services. Metro system under study.
são	Paulo
integrated	system
(2002)
Integrated system under single 
fare with partial BRT treatments in 
some corridors (e.g. Passa-Rapido 
corridor).104 km median busways, 
preferential bus lanes, 327 transfer 
stations, 24 terminals.
13,711 buses: 1,073 articulated, 
5,599 padron (90-passenger), 
2,423 conventional, 3,063 microbus 
(21-passenger), 1,553 minibus  
(42-passenger), integrated  
electronic fare collection system.
 6 million passengers/day.
Private operators under concession 
contracts with the municipal public 
agency SPTrans. Integration has 
been expanded to regional rail and 
several municipal services within the 
metropolitan area.
león
sit-optibús
(2003)
3 BRT trunk corridors with  
25km median busways  
(60% segregated), 3 terminals,  
51 stations, integrated feeder 
services, centralized control. 
55 articulated buses; 500 auxiliary 
and feeder buses; electronic fare 
collection system.
220,000 passengers/day.
Thirteen existing private 
concessionaries formed 4 new 
operators for trunk-ways and continue 
feeder services operation. System 
under expansion (Phase II) including 
reorganization of citywide services. 
Jakarta
transjakarta
(2004)
Three BRT trunk corridors with 37 
km median busway, 4 terminals, 
63 stations, poor integrated feeder, 
centralized control
162 conventional buses (12 m), 
electronic fare collection system.
260,000 passengers/day.
Two private operators, physical 
integration with commuter train and 
local buses.
México	City
Metrobús
insurgentes
(2005)
Two BRT corridors, 50 km median 
busway, 77 stations, four terminals, 
centralized control using ITS
209 articulated buses,  
12 bi-articulated buses, electronic  
fare collection system. 
450,000 passengers/day. 
Eight bus operators, (one public),  
two fare collection contractors, 
physical integration with regional 
buses, regional rail and Metro.
Table 2  Overview of Reviewed Bus Systems (2009)
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City
ProJeCt	(initiAl	yeAr)
GenerAl	DesCriPtion
suPPly/
DeMAnD
CoMMents
Beijing
Beijing	Brt
(2005)
One BRT trunk corridor with 16 km 
median busway, one terminal, 19 
stations, centralized control.
60 articulated low-floor buses, 
manual fare collection system.
120,000 passengers/day.
One private operator, and
physical integration with Metro.
Pereira
Megabús
(2006)
16 km exclusive busways (50% in 
median, 50% on left side on one-way 
streets in downtown), plus 800m  
in mixed traffic on a major bridge,  
37 stations, two terminals, 
centralized control.
52 articulated buses, 82 small feeder 
buses, electronic fare collection and 
control system. 
115,000 passengers/day.
Two private operators of buses,  
one fare collection concessionaire.
Guayaquil
Metrovía
(2006)
35 km exclusive bus lanes on the 
median or left side on one way 
streets, 60 stations, 3 terminals, 
centralized control. 
92 articulated buses, 80 feeder 
buses, electronic fare collection 
system. 
300,000 passengers/day.
One private concessionaire for 
bus operations, one fare collection 
and technology provider. System 
expansion in 2007.
santiago
transantiago
(2007)
18.8 km of segregated corridors, 
4.6 km of new road connections, 
62.7 km of improvements in road 
geometry and pavements (in seven 
corridors), 70 large bus shelters 
along the main corridors, and three 
intermodal stations.
45 km expansion of Metro network. 
1,200 new low-floor articulated 
buses, 1,500 conventional trunk 
buses (to be gradually replaced by 
new low-floor buses), and 2,300 
feeder buses. Integrated electronic 
fare collection system. 
5.7 million passengers/day.
Buses privately operated through 14 
concession contracts: one private 
operator for financial management, 
one private operator for systems 
integration (control and user 
information), and one public operator 
(Metro).
Guadalajara
Macrobús
(2009)
16km of median busways, 27 
stations, integrated feeders, 
centralized control.
41 articulated buses, 103 feeder 
buses, electronic fare collection. 
127,000 passengers/day.
Good integration with light rail system 
and feeder routes, one private 
concessionaire for bus operations.
Ahmedabad
Janmarg
(2009)
18km of exclusive median busways, 
26 stations, centralized control.
25 conventional trunk buses,  
manual fare collection. 
35,000 passengers/day.
One public bus operator, one private 
fare collection contract and one ITS 
contract.
Sources: data from curitiba http://www.curitiba.pr.gov.br; Quito http://www.quito.gov.ec; bogotá http://www.transmilenio.gov.co; prefeitura 
do Municipio de são paulo, “o plano do Transporte público em implantacao na Gestao de 2001-04”, 2004; direción General de Transporte, 
Municipalidad de león, “sistema integrado de Transporte optibús”; Movilidad amable, centro de desarrollo sustentable, México d.F., 
“Metrobús: bienvenidos a bordo”, septiembre de 2005; institute for Transportation & development policy, “Making Transjakarta a world class 
brT system: Final recommendations”, June 2005; beijing Transportation research center, “brT demonstration project brT in south-Middle 
corridor in beijing”, brief report on Feasibility study, september, 2003; pereira http://www.megabus.gov.co; Guayaquil http://www.metrovia-
gye.com/start.htm; santiago http://www.transantiago.cl; santiago interviews, 2006 and 2007; dario Hidalgo et al, “el sistema Macrobús 
de Guadalajara: un concepto avanzado de planeación e implantación de Transporte Masivo brT”, March 2010,  http://tris.trb.org/view.
aspx?id=910301; centre of excellence in urban Transport, “Janmarg: brTs ahmedabad, after Five Months of commercial operations”, april 
2010, http://www.ahmedabadbrts.com/reports/5th_month_report.pdf
Table 2  (continuted)
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In terms of peak usage on a single BRT corridor, 
TransMilenio’s Avenida Caracas in Bogotá, is the best 
performing, with 43,000 passengers per hour in each 
direction. Passa-Rapido in São Paulo and the Alameda 
in Santiago, with around 20,000 passengers per hour 
in each direction, also carry very high volumes. High-
capacity corridors such as these have additional bus-
only lanes at stations to allow buses to overtake each 
other. Many of the remaining corridors have single lanes 
and only carry 1,800 to 13,000 passengers per hour in 
each direction (figure 2). 
figure 1  Total Passenger Demand (2009)
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Notes: scope of the systems varies with respect to inclusion of brT components and level of integration. For example, the data for santiago, 
são paulo and curitiba cover the entire citywide integrated bus systems, of which only a small portion is on brT corridors. For all other 
cities, passenger data primarily refers to brT passengers. For santiago and são paulo passenger demand data is daily boardings not daily 
passengers, so each transfer counts as a separate boarding. bogotá data is from 2010. colors differentiate each city.
Average commercial speeds vary from Transjakarta’s 
low speed of 15 km/hour to 28 km/hour in Bogotá’s 
TransMilenio (figure 3). Higher speeds are achieved as 
more BRT components are integrated. For example, the 
introduction of segregated busways, platform boarding, 
prepayment, larger buses, express services, centralized 
control, and reduced numbers of intersections all 
contribute to increased average speed and effectiveness. 
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Highest operational productivity5 was achieved in 
Guayaquil where Metrovía reported 13 passenger 
boardings per bus-km (figure 4). The lowest levels 
of productivity were reported in Jakarta, Beijing and 
Bogotá (around five passenger boardings per  
bus-km). Even these relatively low levels of operational 
productivity are still five times greater than those 
observed in traditional systems operating in  
mixed traffic. 
figure 2  Peak Loads (2009)
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Notes: são paulo and Quito data from 2006. data unavailable for santiago.
In terms of capital productivity (average number of daily 
passengers per bus), Guadalajara’s Macrobús reported 
3,100 passengers per bus per weekday and Guayaquil’s 
Metrovía nearly 3,000 (figure 5). Lowest capital 
productivity was reported in León with 396 passengers 
per bus per weekday6. 
5 operational productivity is defined as passenger boardings per day (output) per daily bus kilometers (input). There are external factors affecting 
operational productivity such as corridor density, trip length, and availability and characteristics of transport alternatives. conversely, there are 
also internal factors such as the way routes are programmed (radial/diametric, short/long, local/express), minimum headways, and occupancy 
levels, among others. 
6 This figure combines segregated and mixed traffic operations.
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figure 3  Commercial Speeds (2009)
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figure 4  Operational Productivity—Passenger Boardings per Bus-km (2009)
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Total capital costs of bus system improvements varied 
from US$1.4 million per kilometer (Jakarta) to US$12.5 
million per kilometer (Bogotá) as shown in figure 6. 
New transit systems requiring only minor physical 
improvements to the roadway cost in the range of 
US$1.4–3.50 million per kilometer to implement. Major 
reconstruction of corridor roadways, two bus lanes 
per direction, or new trolleybus systems required 
more capital investment: US$3.8–12.5 million per 
kilometer. In each city, the infrastructure to support 
system operations was built by local agencies with 
figure 5  Capital Productivity—Average Daily Passengers per Bus (2009)
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Notes: são paulo and Quito data from 2006. data unavailable for Jakarta and santiago.
local and external (state or national government) funds. 
León and México City also attracted private capital 
through concession contracts for the construction or 
improvement of stations and bus stops. Quito (Trolebús 
and Ecovía), Jakarta and Beijing purchased their buses 
with public funds and the México City municipality 
directly acquired 20% of the bus fleet7. Quito and 
México City also procured fare collection equipment 
with public funds. Other systems have equipment 
provided by the private sector, which is paid back with 
user fares.
7 There are two operators in México city’s Metrobús: a private operator cisa and a public operator rTp; the buses acquired by rTp are funded 
by the municipality.
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Fares in most systems were below US$0.80 per trip 
as of 2009, with the exception of Curitiba and São 
Paulo whose fares are US$1.27 and 1.33 respectively 
(figure 7). Most systems with fares below US$0.40 
(Beijing, Ahmedabad, Jakarta, Quito, México City) 
either received subsidies or were financially strained. 
However, Guayaquil has been able to operate the 
Metrovía system with US$0.25 fares without subsidies, 
due to its very high productivity (13.2 passenger 
boardings per bus-km, and 2,975 passenger boardings 
per bus per day). Supervision and planning agencies 
are typically funded from the general municipal 
budget and not from transit user fares. 
figure 6  Capital Costs per Kilometer (2009)
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são paulo and Quito data from 2006. Guayaquil reports capital costs of $0.986 million/km for the 63 lane-km, which equates  
to $1.97m/km for the 31.5 system kilometers.
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figure 7  user fares (2009)
$1.27
$0.25
$0.79
$1.33
$0.48
$0.37
$0.39
$0.11
$0.74
$0.25
$0.74
$0.47
$0.11
$0.00 $0.25 $0.50 $0.75 $1.00 $1.25 $1.50
RIT, Curitiba
Metrobús-Q, Quito
TransMilenio, Bogotá
São Paulo
SIT-Optibús, León
Transjakarta, Jakarta
Metrobús, México City
BRT 1, Beijing
Megabús, Pereira
Metrovía, Guayaquil
Transantiago, Santiago
Macrobús, Guadalajara
Janmarg, Ahmedabad
Fare  per passenger (US$)
Notes: Quito data from 2006.
overview
emBArQ: Modernizing public Transport   21
lessons learned
synTHesis  
oF FindinGs:  
lessons 
learned
Planning issues
GOOD PLANNING Is GENERALLy RECOGNIzED As 
A KEy suCCEss fACtOR fOR tRANsPORtAtION 
PROJECts (MEyER 2010). Nevertheless, providing 
adequate funding for the planning phase was not a 
high priority for most of our featured cities. This failure 
to invest in planning resulted in significant adverse 
consequences. In many cases, lack of adequate planning 
resulted in project delays. 
It is important to note that none of the selected cities 
started their transportation systems from scratch. Some 
preliminary transportation planning usually preceded 
the decision to go forward with the new BRT system 
or citywide service reorganization. For example, in the 
case of Bogotá, busways had been in place since 1989, 
without full BRT components, and conceptual proposals 
for busway expansion had been proposed. However, no 
advanced feasibility studies had been completed at the 
time the city decided to initiate the TransMilenio project. 
 
On the other hand, advancing planning activities 
depended on the ideas and expectations of key decision 
makers. In cases where the mayor or other political 
leaders had a clear vision for the project (e.g. Curitiba, 
Bogotá, Guayaquil, Jakarta), development cycles were 
short. When commitment at the highest level was not 
clear (e.g. León, Santiago8), project implementation took 
several years. Thus, political commitment played a key 
role in the overall speed and of project planning and 
implementation.
As metropolitan funding for project planning was 
scarce, most cities needed to rely on grants, budget 
allocations from their national governments and loans. 
The process of applying for such funds, as well as 
approval of project activities by sponsoring institutions, 
took several months. As a result, valuable time was lost 
at the beginning of the planning process.
Once high-level commitments were made, planning lead 
times were shortened to make project implementation 
possible within a short window of opportunity, such as 
before the end of the term limit of supportive elected 
officials. Generally, when cities used experienced teams 
and contracted capable consultants, project design 
happened faster. However, planning became difficult in 
cases when local staff, consultants and/or international 
support organizations (providing technical or financial 
assistance) were unfamiliar with BRT applications. Such 
situations resulted in protracted discussions of technical 
issues such as the design of busways (median/curbside), 
types of platform (high/low), corridor capacity, propulsion 
technology (compressed natural gas, diesel), and type 
of payment (on-board/prepayment). It is also important 
to note that most of the effort at this stage was assigned 
to resolving transport planning and engineering issues, 
with less effort dedicated to key institutional, legal and 
financial issues. 
Another aspect that affected project planning was 
the definition of transit fares by the relevant public 
regulatory authority. In general, decision makers in 
our featured cities were tempted to set fares as low 
as possible for all users, to maximize political buy-in. 
This left little financial breathing room for planners 
to incorporate optimal technical and institutional 
components of a BRT system, such as new, larger buses, 
advanced fare collection and control systems, and new 
operators organized as formal companies. 
Cities took different approaches to settling final 
fare levels. In projects with competitive bidding for 
bus operating concessions (e.g. Bogotá, Pereira and 
8 despite the fact that Transantiago was a commitment of ricardo lagos as a presidential candidate, the project did not have full support 
of other top government officials and many key decisions were delayed or changed through the planning and implementation process.  
For instance, the leadership of the project planning and implementation team changed 4 times in 6 years.
22   emBArQ: Modernizing public Transport
Santiago) final fares were determined as a result of the 
bidding process itself. Initial user fares were calculated 
based on prospective operators’  bids and the contracts 
built in adjustment formulas to account for changes 
in the cost of fuel, labor and other supplies over time. 
In other systems, fares were defined by the political 
authorities and did not necessarily reflect actual system 
costs. This produced various predictable adverse 
consequences: Quito´s system was not able to generate 
enough surpluses to repay the operators of trolley 
buses9 and Ecovía buses, while the México City, Jakarta 
and Beijing systems operated under financial stress until 
fare increases were approved. 
One consistent and effective feature of the case studies 
was that the planning and implementation teams were 
set up outside existing public institutional frameworks, 
in order to overcome the burden of business-as-usual in 
existing agencies. Most cities created ad-hoc “task forces” 
that were later transformed into new institutions.
decision-making Processes
Two types of decision-making processes were observed 
with respect to the origin of the initiatives: top-down 
and bottom-up. Top-down decision making originates 
in the upper echelons of the political hierarchy such 
as elected officials and cabinet-level authorities. 
Bottom-up decision making is precisely the opposite. 
It originates with proposals from staff at the planning 
or implementation agencies or from comprehensive 
long-term planning processes. Top-down approaches 
were implemented in Curitiba, Bogotá, Quito, Guayaquil, 
São Paulo, Jakarta, Beijing, Ahmedabad and Guadalajara 
and bottom-up approaches in León, México City, Pereira 
and Santiago. Top-down processes took less time and 
reduced initial conflicts between agencies. Nevertheless, 
some interagency conflicts generally emerged later in 
the process during the operational phase. For instance, 
in the case of Bogotá, the leadership of the Mayor 
made interagency cooperation straightforward in 
TransMilenio’s Phase I, but lack of the same leadership 
in successive administrations made interagency 
cooperation difficult in Phases II and III. This resulted in 
delayed implementation and increased costs. 
The experience across our featured cities suggests 
that adequate governance and regulatory structures 
are as important as resolving all the technical details 
when aiming to create effective bus-based transport 
systems. All the city transport improvement schemes we 
reviewed required either regulatory change, the transfer 
of public transportation authority between different 
levels of government, or the creation of new institutions 
to develop the projects. For example, São Paulo passed 
a new city transportation law that made possible 
the changes required for an integrated public transit 
system, including integrated fares. In Quito and León, 
the transport regulatory authority was transferred from 
the national and state level respectively, to the local 
level. Bogotá, México City and Guayaquil created new 
institutions for transport system development  
and oversight. 
Typically there were no general public transportation 
regulatory and oversight institutions, such as regulatory 
commissions or superintendence agencies, in charge 
of defining and overseeing user fares and quality of 
service. Consequently, the new governance structures 
that cities put in place for project planning were mostly 
contract based. This meant that the distribution of 
responsibilities, risks and revenues was defined in 
contractual instruments between local agencies  
and operators. 
Providing adequate levels of funding for infrastructure 
was challenging, despite the fact that most projects 
had low capital costs compared with rail transit options. 
New funding mechanisms, such as taxes, privatizations, 
and the use of extraordinary budget surplus, as well as 
intergovernmental grants were often required to trigger 
project implementation10. 
implementation Approach
The preferred approach among reviewed cities was to 
manage operations through public private partnerships, 
where the private operators provided the equipment 
and services and the public sector built and maintained 
the infrastructure. Since all cities but Beijing and to 
a certain degree México City had private operators 
9 Government loans provided for trolley bus acquisition were pardoned.
10 For instance, México city used extraordinary funds in the city budget to fund Metrobús infrastructure; bogotá combined new tax revenues 
from a gasoline surcharge, funds from the privatization of the local power company, and transfers from the national Government to fund 
TransMilenio infrastructure. 
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already in place, there was an effort to make them part 
of the new operation. In general, the approach taken 
by authorities was to encourage small enterprises and 
owners to transform themselves into formal companies. 
This was done either through a limited bidding process 
or direct negotiation. In Bogotá and Santiago, politically 
powerful transport authorities were able to open up 
project operations to general bidding. This resulted in 
protests by existing bus operators but made it possible 
to take advantage of competitive bidding. Other city 
authorities negotiated terms and conditions directly 
with the existing operators. This resulted in easier 
implementation (no stand-offs), but with the trade-
off of higher costs and softer contractual conditions, 
as observed, for example, in México City and Quito’s   
Central Norte corridor.
The projects feature a diversity of scope and level 
of integration11, even in their understanding of BRT 
concepts. There are single-corridor projects without 
fare integration with feeders or other transport 
modes (México City, Beijing); projects with sequential 
implementation of non-integrated corridors (Quito, 
Jakarta); some that gradually implement physically 
integrated corridors (Bogotá, Guayaquil); and others 
that deployed extended route reorganizations (São 
Paulo, Santiago, León). Judging from the outcomes 
observed across the cities, sequential implementation 
with clear integration of bus and other public transport 
services is preferable to developing isolated corridors. 
Large-scale route reorganizations (Santiago; São 
Paulo) seem to be the best conceptual approach, as 
this enables optimum use of all system components. 
However, this approach can provoke significant 
opposition from incumbent operators and carries the 
risk of institutional or financial overreaching, as was the 
case in Santiago.
implementation Hurdles 
Most of the transport systems reviewed were rushed 
and started operations without all the planned elements 
in place (table 3). This was generally caused by the 
need to inaugurate projects before the elected officials 
backing them came to the end of their elected term. 
This was the case, for example, in México City, Bogotá, 
León and Guayaquil. Cities where launches were rushed 
generally suffered from problematic initial operations, 
which improved within the first few months. 
Problems were generally encountered in the following 
areas. Infrastructure and fare collection systems were 
delayed due to implementation obstacles or contractual 
problems, such as delays in approvals by various 
authorities. Another common problem was limited 
time between bus delivery and the start of operations, 
resulting in incomplete drivers’  training, as was the case 
in León and México City. Delays were often the result  
of over-optimistic timetables for the delivery of  
different components.
In cities with new BRT projects, user education was 
neglected prior to system implementation causing 
many issues during the first weeks of operation, 
particularly in México City and León. In cities 
launching extensive bus service changes, including 
the TransMilenio Phase II expansion in 2006 and the 
Transantiago launch, insufficient public information and 
education led to chaotic conditions, and, in some cases, 
public protests requiring law enforcement.  
In Quito and Bogotá and during an early phase in 
Santiago12, transport operators also protested, largely 
due to a lack of communication and engagement by 
city authorities. Involving existing operators through 
direct negotiations (México City, León, Jakarta), or 
limiting external actors from the bidding processes 
(Bogotá, Pereira, Guayaquil, São Paulo) helped to ease or 
avoid protests and discontent. Santiago chose to have 
an open bidding process so that transport users would 
reap the benefits of competition for-the-market, but this 
approach also generated some implementation barriers. 
In particular, it necessitated the slow and costly removal 
of the obsolete bus fleet from the hands of traditional 
operators who were not the new concessionaires. 
11 integration can be defined at three levels; physical, operational and fare integration. physical integration refers to infrastructure that allows 
passengers to transfer between bus routes and other modes of transport; operational integration involves coordination of schedules; fare 
integration involves payment of a single fare or reduced fares for combined services. 
12 a pilot implementation of feeder buses for the Metro system in santiago in 2002 resulted in very extensive protests by existing operators; 
the government used the existing laws to prosecute the operators’ leaders.
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City,
systeM
infrAstruCture Buses
fAre	
ColleCtion
Control
user	
eDuCAtion
oBservAtions
Curitiba,
rit
Gradually improved 
over several years
Operators reluctant 
to buy new 
buses—initially 
bought by the 
municipality
Coin based for 
three decades—
electronic ticketing 
in 2006
Manual not 
dynamic control on 
platforms—based 
on schedules 
prepared by the 
municipal urban 
development 
agency (URBS) 
Gradual 
implementation 
made it part of 
the city’s life and 
development
Negotiated 
agreements 
between traditional 
operators and the 
municipality 
Quito,		
trolebus
Pavements were 
not rehabilitated 
and deteriorated 
rapidly
Insufficient for 
initial demand—
required special 
programming
Coin based—fare 
cards abandoned
Manual on 
platforms and 
selected points
Scarce Large protests by 
existing operators
Quito,
ecovía
Ready long before 
buses were 
available
Delayed due to lack 
of finance—bought 
by the municipality
Coin based without 
problems
Manual on 
platforms and 
selected points
Scarce—but users 
knew Trolebus
Difficult to get 
existing operators 
on board
Quito,		
Central	norte
Very incomplete—
no terminal, low-
quality stations
Insufficient—
traditional buses 
not completely 
retired
No fare collection 
system—
large evasion 
opportunities
Manual on 
platforms and 
selected points
Non-existent—
significant 
discontent
No single 
image—low-
quality temporary 
structures
Bogotá,
transMilenio	
Phase	i
Incomplete—
gradually 
introduced
Insufficient due to 
financial difficulties 
of operators
Electronic 
system not 
ready—gradually 
introduced—
unreliable
Started with 
manual control—
systems gradually 
introduced
Abundant—system 
was well received
Protests by existing 
operators—
early pavement 
deterioration
Bogotá,
transMilenio	
Phase	ii
Incomplete—
gradually 
introduced
Gradually 
introduced as 
infrastructure was 
completed
Not prepared for 
expansion—ran out 
of fare cards
Vehicles not 
equipped with 
automatic vehicle 
locators (AVL), 
manually controlled
Scarce—large 
changes in route 
structure
Changes in route 
structure caused 
problems, user 
protests
são	Paulo Passa-Rapido 
corridors gradually 
introduced
Gradually replaced 
over a three-year 
time span
Problems with 
distribution of the 
farecards— 
too many 
transactions  
to process
No centralized 
control—AVL and 
telematics used in 
terminals for user 
information, not 
operational actions
Large promotion 
of the changes 
and the use of 
the farecards—
difficulties in 
reaching users
Operations did 
not improve 
dramatically— 
only Passa-Rapdio 
corridors with 
median lanes
león,	sit	
optibús
Incomplete stations 
and access to one 
terminal
Delivered 
shortly prior to 
implementation—
no trained drivers
Implemented 
long before 
high-capacity 
corridors—
successful
Manual on 
platforms and 
selected points
Abundant—initial 
quality fell short of 
expectations
Lengthy feeder 
bus trips—some 
traditional routes 
reintroduced
Jakarta,
transjakarta
Small stations and 
inefficient terminal
Initial fleet not 
sufficient; 12m- 
buses too small 
with only one door
Delayed 
implementation, 
technical problems
No communication 
with the buses
Scarce, there is not 
a focus on the user
Performance below 
expectations
Table 3  Condition of System Elements When Projects Were Commissioned
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City,
systeM
infrAstruCture Buses
fAre	
ColleCtion
Control
user	
eDuCAtion
oBservAtions
México	City,	
Metrobús	
insurgentes
Incomplete stations Delivered few 
days prior to 
implementation—
no trained drivers
Started with paper 
tickets—gradually 
replaced by 
electronic farecards
AVL introduced 
three months late
Scarce –
widespread  
confusion during 
the initial days of 
operation
Expected speeds 
not achieved—
problems at 
intersections and 
with driver training
Beijing,
Brt	1
Small and 
uncomfortable 
stations
Initial fleet too 
small, low-floor 
buses lose capacity 
to wheel wells and 
steps, poor internal 
circulation
Implemented 
months after initial 
operation
Good control 
but still deficient 
operation
Scarce, there is not 
a focus on the user
Very low fares  
(no subsidies 
allowed), peak 
period crowding 
due to reduced  
bus capacity
Pereira,
Megabús
Incomplete 
corridors—
provisional 
terminals
Feeder bus fleet 
insufficient due to 
route extensions
Insufficient number 
of fare cards—
manual control
Not ready for initial 
operation, gradually 
introduced
Large campaign, 
but scarce focus on 
system operation—
initial confusion
Delays in 
infrastructure due 
to lengthy decision 
process for the 
relocation of utilities
Guayaquil,
Metrovía
Most elements in 
place for corridor 1
Insufficient fleet—
use of small buses 
for trunk operations
Started 
manually—gradual 
implementation of 
farecards
Not ready for initial 
operation, gradually 
introduced
Scarce, difficulties 
in the initial days of 
operation
Did not achieved 
the expected 
speeds
santiago,
transantiago
Long delays 
in busway 
construction 
and planned bus 
shelters were not 
completed on 
time—insufficient 
infrastructure
Only a fraction of 
the contracted fleet 
was available—
operational 
difficulties made 
it necessary to 
increase bus and 
metro fleet
The fare collection 
system was not 
fully operational—
resulted in a full 
week of free-of-
charge services 
Buses were not 
fully equipped 
and centralized 
oversight was not 
operational
Extensive campaign 
was not enough for 
particular needs of 
most users
Very large-scale 
implementation had 
several problems—
transition phase 
using new buses 
on the old route 
system proved 
chaotic
Guadalajara,
Macrobús
Second access to 
stations was not 
available. Sidewalks 
were still being 
upgraded.
Insufficient driver 
training prior to 
implementation 
(buses were 
delivered 
days before 
commissioning)
Electronic fare 
collection using 
smart cards 
was not fully 
operational; 
was gradually 
introduced during 
first four months
Control center 
(buses and traffic) 
was completed four 
months after initial 
operation began
Extensive effort  
but many 
users were not 
well informed, 
particularly about  
the use of  
smart cards
Initial commercial 
speed was very low 
due to lack of driver 
training. A fraction 
of feeder bus users 
was dissatisfied 
due to long transfer 
times. 
Ahmedabad,
Janmarg
Some roadway and 
station elements 
were still being 
completed during 
trial operations 
period. One section 
was temporary—
the pavements and 
stations were to be 
replaced after the 
monsoon season.
Bus fleet was 
underestimated 
(actual passenger 
demand exceeded 
forecasts)
Started manually—
electronic fare 
collection using 
smart cards was 
not fully operational 
after five months 
Centralized control 
was not fully 
operational after 
five months—traffic 
lights were turned 
off at critical 
intersections
Extensive effort to 
educate users and 
provide adequate 
information
Gradual 
implementation as 
system elements 
became available
Sources: interviews with stakeholders, information provided by managing agencies and news reviews
Table 3  (continued)
lessons learned
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Problems during operation
The reviewed systems greatly improved travel conditions 
and generally received good ratings from users.13 
However, some common problems during operation 
highlight the need for several ongoing improvements. 
First, buses are commonly overcrowded during peak 
travel times. Second, pavement condition has often 
been an issue, due either to the use of existing roadway 
without improvements, inadequate pavement structural 
design, or faulty construction. Bus lane segregation 
devices in some cities (e.g. León and México City) 
deteriorated very quickly and required early replacement.
Third, advanced fare collection systems proved 
particularly difficult to implement. These systems are 
intended to reduce fare evasion, to allow for faster 
passenger loading and to generate data for operational 
planning. However, implementation schedules in many 
case study cities were too short to adapt software 
applications to local conditions, resulting in insufficient 
testing and quality assurance. Furthermore, in most 
cases, fare collection systems were not integrated with 
other components of the public transport system 
(Bogotá, México City, Beijing) or even other BRT 
corridors (as in Quito, and in Jakarta during the initial 
four years).
Table 4 summarizes the main concerns encountered,  
by city, during the early operational phase.
Structural Problems
Fortunately, none of the cities' transport systems faced 
such serious problems as to merit a complete overhaul 
of the newly implemented structure. Most importantly, 
nearly all the systems are providing higher-quality 
and higher-performance services than the traditional 
systems they replaced. Nevertheless, our case study 
review highlighted aspects that may challenge system 
sustainability and affect the quality of service delivered. 
Table 5 summarizes structural problems experienced 
in each city. The most critical common challenge was 
maintaining the systems’ operational quality at an 
affordable fare. Financial sustainability was threatened in 
several systems because fares were defined by political 
authorities without a sound and comprehensive 
calculation of cost and revenues. To keep fares low 
and the systems accessible to users of all incomes, 
some cities subsidized system components on top of 
the ubiquitous capital subsidy for infrastructure. For 
instance: Quito (Trolebús, Ecovía) and Jakarta bought 
the vehicles for their systems with public budgets and 
will not necessarily recover these costs from user fares; 
México City bought the buses of the public operator 
RTP with funds from the general municipal budget14; 
São Paulo used direct budget allocations for special 
users; and Santiago covered the new transport system’s 
financial losses with the public budget15. The case of 
Beijing differs from the above, as subsidies are not 
allowed. As a result, low fares are generating financial 
difficulties for the operator. 
Another common problem was limited maintenance 
funds. Municipal public transport systems compete with 
general funding for road maintenance and rarely receive 
timely attention. Opportunities for route expansion are 
limited by resistance to change from existing operators. 
In Bogotá, existing operators that were resistant to 
change have organized themselves to put pressure 
on the local government to slow funding of system 
expansions, and the city government has delayed  
the plans for further expansion beyond Phase III16. 
In México City, negotiation with operators in each 
corridor expansion has become extremely complex,  
as they have raised their financial expectations. 
Renegotiation of agreements between authorities 
and private operators further threatened the financial 
sustainability of many systems. Even though contract 
renegotiation is welcome when external conditions 
affect the financial equilibrium both for government 
13 The only system in the review with poor ratings from the users is Transantiago. nevertheless, ratings have improved steadily in the first 
year of operation, and with the changes introduced in service and supervision, user ratings are expected to continue improving in 2008. 
14 Furthermore, the cost of operation of rTp was not covered by the farebox revenue of the Metrobús corridor during the first year, 
generating a “subsidy by default”. 
15 in 2009 the chilean congress passed a law making subsidies for public transport permanent.
16 The city is currently planning for a Metro line, and has not included additional expansions of TransMilenio in the approved plans.
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and private operators, most negotiations seem to favor 
private interests. Renegotiation is most common in 
directly assigned contracts (such as in México City, León, 
Quito’s Central Norte, and Jakarta), but also happens in 
contracts resulting from open bidding processes, such 
as in Bogotá, in order to adjust conditions as systems 
evolve. Conversely, in the case of Santiago, contract 
renegotiation in favor of the public interest was done to 
save the Transantiago system from collapse in 200717. 
From a technical point of view, there are different needs 
and concerns specific to each system, as indicated in 
table 5. Most of the technical problems require both 
a political decision and for funding constraints to be 
resolved. There are major challenges of this kind in 
Santiago, Quito, Bogotá and Jakarta in particular. 
In Santiago, after a chaotic transit system launch 
featuring user protests, the government took action to 
introduce enclosed interchange facilities and exclusive 
bus lanes, to expand the bus fleet, and to provide 
stronger control mechanisms. Improvements during the 
first three years of operation were significant, and by the 
end of 2009 Transantiago was perceived as providing 
a higher-quality service than previous operations. The 
outlook in Santiago is positive, with structural changes 
completed citywide and a clear improvement plan in 
place, including the implementation of high-capacity 
infrastructure in the trunk corridors.
In the case of Quito, the Central Norte Corridor 
infrastructure has not yet been completed, and the 
capacity of the Trolleybus has been exceeded, sparking 
interest in a Light Rail Transit (LRT) alternative. Moreover, 
there is a lack of physical and fare integration among 
the three BRT corridors. The LRT debate has resulted in 
slow action on short-term improvements and system 
integration of the BRT.
In Bogotá’s TransMilenio, service quality perception 
has declined recently compared to the initial years of 
operation, despite constant route upgrades and bus 
fleet expansions. There are proposals underway to 
integrate fares between TransMilenio and traditional 
services citywide, to build an integrated Metro system, 
and to explore a light rail alternative. These discussions 
have slowed action for short-term improvements in the 
existing TransMilenio system, such as new connections 
among corridors, construction of intermediate return 
points, introduction of bi-articulated buses and 
reduction of competition from traditional bus services 
on parallel routes.
In Jakarta, both facilities and buses need expanding and 
upgrading. Given that the system’s corridors are handled 
by different operators using dissimilar fare collection 
technologies, Jakarta has been unable to reach fare 
integration and passengers are required to pay twice  
to complete their journeys.
17 private operators were required to expand the bus fleet and assume higher risks than initially established, in order to be able to improve service 
quality and keep the system in operation. The government increased the oversight mechanisms and committed to create a permanent subsidy.
lessons learned
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City,	systeM MAin	oPerAtionAl	ConCerns
Curitiba,	
rit	
- Operating close to capacity in some sections and stations of the busway (structural corridor)
 - Large number of transfers required
 - Insufficient service during peak hours and excessive service off-peak
 - Inflexible operations—no clear balance between supply and demand
Quito,	
Metrobús-Q
- On-board vehicle and station crowding during peak periods (Trolebús and Ecovía)
- Long waiting and travel times in feeder buses (Central Norte)
- Non-integrated corridors 
- Buses were subsidized—no funding for vehicle replacement (Trolebús)
- Demand below expectations may cause financial problems to private operators (Central Norte)
- Protracted and unsuccessful contract negotiations with historic private operators (Ecovía)
- Feeder buses remain under traditional operation (Central Norte)
- No clear system vision (proposed replacement by LRT) (Trolebús)
Bogotá,	transMilenio	 - On-board vehicle and station crowding during peak periods; delays in accessing feeder buses
- Rest of the city has very poor transport service 
- Funding for system expansion is lacking
são	Paulo	 - Long dwell times and “bunching” of buses in critical sections
- Invasion of bus lanes, especially those located on the curb-side
- Low travel speeds outside the Passa-Rapido corridors
león,
optibús
- Some feeder routes with reverse commuting (from city to suburbs) result in long travel times
- Invasion of the bus lanes by general traffic (sometimes encouraged by the traffic authorities)
- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods  
Jakarta,	transjakarta - On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods 
- Service among corridors is not integrated, passengers are required to make transfers and pay additional fares
- Currently subsidized
- Difficult negotiations with the private operators
México	City,
Metrobús	insurgentes
- On-board vehicle and station crowding during peak periods  
- Isolated corridor
- Financially stressed—needed fare increase 
- Permanent negotiation of conditions with private operators
Beijing,	
Brt	1
- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods 
- Isolated corridor
- Needs subsidy—bus operator faces possible bankruptcy
- Mixed traffic operations reduce reliability
- Requires new stations
Pereira,	
Megabús
- Insufficient capacity in temporary terminal facilities—resolved with the opening of the Cuba terminal in August 2008
- Poor reorganization of the remaining bus routes
- Flexibility of buses not fully used in operations 
Guayaquil,
Metrovía
- On-board vehicle crowding during peak periods  
- High temperatures and humidity—buses not equipped with air conditioning
- User fare defined by a national political authority—US$0.25 per trip with a reduced fare for students and people with 
disabilities—and not on the basis of costs and revenue
santiago,
transantigo
- Insufficient infrastructure to support operations (lack of integration points, segregated bus lanes)
- Expected commercial speeds not achieved; hence, an increase in bus fleet is required
- Lack of adequate oversight of required minimum levels of service led to the non-compliance of some contractors 
- The system is operating with an initially unexpected permanent subsidy requiring national congressional approval
Guadalajara,
Macrobús
- High temperature inside the buses
- Low commercial speeds (gradually improved as operators received necessary training)
- Penetration of electronic fare collection was small, the majority of users pay with coins at the turnstiles
Ahmedabad,
Janmarg
- Highly uncertain passenger demand, since BRT is in a rapidly developing  area
- Demand exceeded expectation and initial fleet was insufficient
- Lack of centralized control and dependable traffic control system resulted in unreliable operations (large variance in 
service frequency) 
Sources: interviews with stakeholders and information provided by managing agencies
Table 4  Main Operational Concerns
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City,	systeM finAnCiAl	sustAinABility teCHniCAl	DesiGn
Quito,	
Metrobús-Q
Not clear: fares are politically defined; depends on the 
ability of public administrators to subsidize buses;  
no earmarked funds for maintenance; ambiguous contract 
conditions for private sector operations (Ecovía); actual user 
demand is probably below expectations (Corredor Central 
Norte).
Trolebús corridor currently operating beyond capacity—
needs overhaul and expansion (of station length, operation 
of bus platoons); LRT is being proposed as one solution.
Corridor Central Norte operating with temporary facilities 
(terminals) and incomplete implementation of route 
reorganization. 
Bogotá,	transMilenio		
Phases	i	and	ii
Clear: fares established in contracts; however, expansion 
limited by pressure from existing operators and lack of 
funds; also no earmarked funds for maintenance (existing 
funds dedicated to system expansion).
Decline in level of service requires construction of special 
infrastructure, revision of routes, and fleet expansion (which 
will be limited due to impact on user fares).TransMilenio 
also lacks integrated fares with other bus services. 
são	Paulo Not clear: growing pressure for free or reduced-fare 
services provided from the public budget; high existing 
fares inconsistent with service provision for the poor.
On-board ticket validation generates long dwell times at 
stations; some stations are also too short; requires faster 
replacement of curb lanes with median lanes. 
león,	
sit	optibús
Clear: fares negotiated with all operators; however, no 
earmarked funds for maintenance.
Bus lanes easily invaded—geometric improvements 
required.
Jakarta,	transjakarta Not clear: fare defined as social policy and currently 
subsidized.
Limited capacity: can be addressed with larger buses (i.e. 
18m with four doors), larger stations and shorter traffic 
signal cycle times.
México	City,		
Metrobús	insurgentes
Not clear: fares politically defined; permanent negotiation 
with private operators; fares currently subsidized; no 
earmarked funds for maintenance.
Limited capacity—system could be easily extended by 
expanding stations and bus convoys; intersections easily 
blocked—requires geometric improvements.
Beijing,	
Brt	1
Not clear: fares set below system costs; operator may face 
bankruptcy.
Limited capacity: can be easily expanded with a larger fleet 
and operational improvements; could modify stations and 
fleet to accommodate high-platform/high-floor buses.
Pereira,
Megabús
Not clear: fares established in contracts but traditional 
services are not integrated and the system faces 
competition; no earmarked funds for maintenance.
Requires completion of Dosquebradas Terminal and better 
connection to Cuba Terminal; excessive transfers, probably 
mitigated with hybrid operation where feeder buses are 
able to continue in the trunk corridor.
Guayaquil,
Metrovía
Not clear: fares defined by a national authority (US$ 0.25) 
with reduced fares for special groups.
Limited capacity in first corridor; second corridor designed 
for higher capacity with passing lanes at stations.
santiago,
transantiago
Clear: fares established in contracts, with funding for 
system operations provided by law; additional investments 
financed with government funds.
Trunk-feeder scheme increased transfers and route design 
resulted in longer walking times; requires infrastructure to 
enhance bus operations and integration. 
Guadalajara,
Macrobús
Not clear: financial equilibrium was very tight during the 
first year, fare increase is not based on inputs.
Challenging busway geometry in some sections.
Buses are not air conditioned.
Ahmedabad,
Janmarg
Not clear: the public-private partnership agreement has 
clear financial clauses; nevertheless the system is gradually 
replacing the state-owned provider which receives public 
funds for operations.
Initial operation is (mainly) within exclusive busways 
(mainly) without integration with BRT feeders or the 
conventional transport system. This is expected to be 
solved in further phases as the system grows. 
Sources: interviews with stakeholders and information provided by managing agencies
Table 5 Structural Problems of Selected Systems
lessons learned
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Conclusions and
recoMMendaTions
conclusions 
and recoM-
MendaTions
MOst Of tHE bus IMPROVEMENts IN LAtIN 
AMERICAN AND AsIAN CItIEs REVIEWED IN tHIs 
PAPER HAVE HAD POsItIVE OutCOMEs. They have 
improved the travel conditions for users and raised the 
quality and performance of public transport, particularly 
in relation to faster, more efficient services. There have 
also been associated environmental and social benefits. 
As efficiency has improved, systems have reduced 
energy consumption and polluting emissions. Public 
infrastructure redevelopment and urban revitalization 
are evident in Curitiba, São Paulo (Passa-Rapido), 
Bogotá, Quito (Trolebús), Pereira and Guayaquil where 
appalling urban environment conditions along the bus 
corridors have been dramatically improved. Air quality 
improvements are also evident in Santiago. 
Despite these benefits, the projects were also 
characterized by several planning, implementation and 
operational challenges. Most of these issues were not 
directly associated with the bus systems themselves, but 
with prevailing planning and implementation practices 
and external constraints in financial and institutional 
matters. The specific issues pertaining to each system 
are identified in our in-depth city case studies (available 
online at EMBARQ’s website (www.embarq.org) and in 
the summary tables presented above. 
Key lessons learned support the following general 
recommendations for city transport planners and 
political authorities18:
Planning Phase
• Institute a comprehensive planning process 
which combines financial, legal, institutional 
and environmental concerns with engineering/ 
technical efforts.
• Improve the quality of information used to make 
decisions on key building blocks of a new or 
improved transport system, such as: route selection, 
basic infrastructure concepts (median lanes, types 
of stations, terminals), vehicle technologies, and 
types of operation (open vs. closed systems).
• Reliable data (i.e. trip origins and destinations, 
travel by income and gender) are required 
for adequate understanding of the demand 
patterns, socioeconomic conditions and baseline 
characteristics of existing public transit operations. 
• Dedicate enough resources (time and money) for 
adequate project preparation, but avoid endless 
alternatives analysis. 
• Use best practices from other cities as a reference, 
but adapt infrastructure, operations, and 
institutional frameworks to local conditions. 
• Seek to create special-purpose full-time teams for 
system planning and implementation, independent 
from day-to-day responsibilities. 
decision-making Process
• Get approval from high-level decision makers early 
on in the process as top-down approaches are 
faster and resolve interagency conflict. At the same 
time, maintain community involvement through 
education and participatory processes. 
• Maintain and nurture high-level approval and buy-
in during the implementation and operation of the 
system.
• Pay careful attention to regulatory/institutional 
issues, adapting the existing regulatory framework 
if required. Proceed with special care where the bus 
improvement is to be integrated with an existing 
metro system, and convince the rail operator 
that the BRT is complementary, not a competing 
element in transport supply.
18 The expanded case studies address some of the recommendations in more detail and are tailored to the context of each city.
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• Create a special-purpose agency to plan, oversee 
and control system development, and provide 
adequate coordination mechanisms. 
• Be creative in funding project development, using 
new taxes, loans and non-traditional sources such 
as privatizations, special purpose bonds, real estate 
development, etc. 
• Involve existing operators to mitigate conflicts, but 
use bidding processes to reduce user costs through 
increased competition for-the-market. 
design Phase
• Only attempt citywide reorganization of transit 
services where the institutional capacity for 
regulations and enforcement is strong and there is 
broad public support. 
• Define clear development objectives, estimate 
passenger demand and develop a service plan as 
the basis for physical and operational design.
• Implement gradually, adapting the project on the 
basis of initial “demonstration” experience. 
• Make an effort to use existing right-of-way 
to reduce land acquisition and involuntary 
displacement. 
• Use sound engineering design to produce 
adequate infrastructure; pay special attention to 
pavement design and construction to avoid rapid 
deterioration.
• Prefer median lanes and level access platforms with 
many bus boarding doors to increase speed and 
reliability.
• Use strong lane dividers to segregate traffic. Focus 
on physical integration during planning and 
design phases (e.g. match vehicle floor and station 
platform heights).
• Design vehicles (e.g., their size, internal configuration, 
number of doors and configuration) and other 
physical features for market and service plan.
• Wherever possible, minimize the negative effects 
on mixed-traffic flow as increased traffic congestion 
can create vociferous criticism and jeopardize 
support for the bus improvement.
implementation Phase
• Generate and manage a realistic schedule to avoid 
rushed implementation. System commissioning 
dates usually do not allow much opportunity for 
extension due to term lengths of elected officials.
• Have contingency plans ready if system 
components are not complete. 
• Dedicate funds to plan and implement user 
education programs.
• Involve the community in implementation through 
adequate information and various participation/ 
engagement programs
operational Phase
• Match service operations to supply and demand, 
using the intrinsic flexibility of buses. For example, 
allow departures from the fixed route, introduce 
mid-way returns, and operate express services. 
Note that feeder-trunk operations might not be 
applicable to all local conditions.
• Restructure or transform existing bus operations so 
that they complement rather than compete with 
the new system.
• Account for required infrastructure maintenance 
such as pavement, stations, and terminals. 
• Allow time to adapt and implement advanced fare 
collection systems. 
• Use advanced transit management systems if 
operations are complex, and apply them as tools to 
control reliability, not just as a means of acquiring 
operational data. 
• Pay attention to the system’s image, through good 
public information provision, user surveys, and careful 
maintenance of fixed infrastructure and vehicles. 
Structural issues
• Define fares using technical (automatic) methods, 
in order to avoid financial difficulties and political 
interference. 
• Adhere to operating contracts and avoid 
continuous renegotiation. Permanent renegotiation 
has often tipped in favor of operators. 
• Integrate the system development with other 
transport initiatives such as construction of non-
motorized facilities and implementation of rail 
transit projects.
• Apply transit-oriented development concepts  
to enhance positive impacts and reinforce  
project sustainability. Consider a general land-use 
reform, permitting higher densities along the  
mass transit corridor. 
• Have a clear vision for system expansion.
conclusions and recoMMendaTions
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There are several aspects of planning, implementing 
and operating urban bus improvements in which this 
review can be complemented, expanded and updated. 
in particular there are six topics of study that deserve 
further discussion: co-benefits of transport, operational 
performance, governance issues, implementation 
approaches, financial structures, and the factors which 
favor brT or urban rail systems.
while the reviewed cities reported improvements 
in travel time, travel cost, greenhouse gas and 
air pollutant emissions, safety, and public health, 
further analysis of these impacts would improve the 
understanding of co-benefits	of	transport. eMbarQ 
is conducting research on road safety and brT, 
and through the brT-alc centre of excellence is 
assessing the transport and environmental impacts of 
worldwide brT systems.
operational	performance is discussed in this 
study, but further analysis could explore the 
underlying differences between bus systems. a 
detailed review of how the design and operation of 
brT and citywide bus systems relate to operational 
efficiencies would be helpful. with the brT-alc centre 
of excellence, eMbarQ is analyzing the physical, 
financial, institutional, and other factors affecting brT 
performance.
Governance	issues for urban transportation are 
mentioned in the study but require more extensive 
analysis. a systematic review drawing from the 
governance literature could better define challenges 
and elaborate on institutional barriers and solutions. 
also helpful would be an explicit analysis of the 
structure, authority, and funding of planning agencies 
and how issues of accountability have been handled. 
The development of regulatory and oversight agencies 
may be another area of study. Finally, the issues of 
public disclosure and participation in project planning, 
implementation, and evaluation need further review. 
implementation	approaches can be gradual 
processes (corridor by corridor) or citywide 
transformations. The results of the reviewed systems 
suggest that gradual approaches can have very 
interesting initial impacts but lead to difficulties in terms 
of integration and expansion. citywide transformations, 
on the other hand, face significant initial challenges, 
as observed in santiago, but may provide a solid and 
sustainable base for transit provision in the medium 
and long term. Further investigation of the advantages, 
disadvantages, and required processes in each case 
would be fruitful.
regarding financial	structures, most systems 
in latin america have been promoted as covering 
capital equipment and operational costs with revenue 
from user fares, without the need for general budget 
allocations. However, this approach can affect both 
user convenience and the system’s image, as service 
quality suffers because of the desire to maintain a 
financial equilibrium. improvements in efficiency have 
not proved large enough to cover the additional 
costs of formalization of unregulated services and 
fares in new systems have a tendency to be higher 
than in existing systems. This suggests a need to 
better understand the dilemma between quality of 
service and cost. an acceptable bus occupancy 
level for developing cities has yet to be defined, 
with the current standards repeatedly reported 
as unacceptable in user surveys. also requiring 
exploration is the economic justification of subsidies 
from the general budget vis-à-vis the positive 
externalities of public transportation for society at 
large—reduced congestion, noise, local air pollutants, 
greenhouse gases and accidents, and denser urban 
development. other sources of funding, such as value 
capture mechanisms from real estate developments 
and transfers from less efficient modes through 
congestion and parking charging schemes also need 
to be explored.
rail	systems (light rail or metro) are often considered 
a superior alternative to brT. However, for both 
modes, there is a knowledge gap about operating and 
maintenance costs, as well as environmental, social, 
and urban development impacts. studies comparing 
the life-cycle costs and benefits of rail and brT would 
help clarify which mode can most effectively reduce 
congestion, air pollution, and energy use. with too 
much decision making based on ideological arguments 
or commercial interests, objective analyses and case 
studies can identify situations where a certain mode of 
transport is clearly superior. 
ongoing updates of the data and information about 
the evolution of the reviewed systems, as well as case 
studies on new systems, will also enhance the pool of 
lessons learnt from bus systems improvements.
fUrTHer STUdieS
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